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NATURAL LAW AND THE GENTILES




The denial of natural law is one of the prevailing characteristics of
modern thought. From this two questions arise. What are the grounds
of the opposition? And what can be done to revive this doctrine as the
accepted basis of our moral and social life?
I
The fact of the denial needs no demonstration. The protests are
numerous, incisive and often bitter. As John Dewey expressed it, "The
intellectual basis of the legal theory of natural law and natural rights
has been undermined by historical and philosophical criticism." To
Mr. Justice Holmes, natural law was a fiction invented to account for
the fact that certain things seemed necessary in civilized society. On
the other side of the Atlantic, Vilfredo Pareto expressed himself in
similar vein, saying, "Little or no progress has been made since Cicero's
time; and writers on natural law continue to make all possible combina-
tions of the same concepts, save that the God of the Christians replaces
the pagan Gods, a scientific varnish is applied, and a pseudo science is
invited to reveal just what Milady Nature would have us do." Pareto's
criticism was but an echo of the scorn of Montaigne, who had written,
"Certainly they are amusing, these people, when they try to lend a certain
amount of authority to their laws by saying that some of them are fixed,
perpetual, immutable, which they call natural laws and which are im-
printed upon human beings by the requirements of their very nature."
The late Morris R. Cohen summed up the modern attitude by saying,
"The attempt to defend a doctrine of natural rights before historians
and political scientists would be treated very much like an attempt to
defend the belief in witchcraft. It would be regarded as emanating
only from the intellectual underworld."
To one reared, as it were, in the natural law-indeed, to one reared
in the Declaration of Independence and in the American tradition-all
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this is ground for wonder and leads directly to the question, what can
account for this strange intellectual phenomenon whereby that which
characterizes human reason in almost innate fashion has become the
object of such scornful opposition?
II
Before trying to answer this question, let us sketch briefly the doc-
trine which is under attack.
Do good and avoid evil is the first principle of the practical reason,
the equivalent of the principle of contradiction in the theoretic reason.
The good thus referred to signifies the totality of goods. One of these
goods is the social good. In respect to that good, the first principle may
be expressed, Seek the common good and avoid the common evil, or
do good to others, harm no one, and render to each his own.
Do good and avoid evil is the natural law, strictly speaking, with
respect to the whole of goods. Seek the common good, or do good to
others, harm no one, and render to each his own, is the natural law,
strictly speaking, in reference to man's good as a social being.
This first principle prescribes the end of laws. From this end are
deduced the necessary means, which as such are contained, by impli-
cation, in the end. Examples of these are the precepts, do not kill, steal
or slander, contracts must be carried out, and so on.
But these are the means considered only universally or generally,
that is, considered without regard to the contingent facts of social life,
including the changing circumstances of time and place. As such they
are inadequate to govern conduct. To govern conduct they have to be
converted into laws in the ordinary sense. This conversion consists in
the process called determination. Determination is the process by which
the universal means are reembodied in more particularized form which
takes into account the contingent circumstances of the society to which
they are to be applied and which prescribes what shall be done and what
shall not be done in such circumstances. Thus it reembodies the pre-
cept against killing by the laws of homicide; it reembodies the precept
against stealing by the laws of theft and kindred crimes; it reembodies
the precept regarding the performance of promises by the laws of
contracts.
In addition to precepts of this character, which are applicable to all
societies because they flow from the nature of man as such and are there-
fore derived by conclusion from the first principle, there are other
precepts which presuppose a given type of society and which direct the
observance of everything necessary for the general welfare of that society.
Thus a traffic ordinance is a determination of a precept calling for effi-
ciency and safety in transportation, the necessity for which flows from
the contingent character of a given society such as that of our own day.
Therefore a law is an application of the first principle of the prac-
tical reason prescribing the common good, which application is made by
determining the generally necessary means of the common good to relate
them to the contingent facts and circumstances of social life, thus render-
ing those means serviceable as guides of just conduct and as criteria of
legal judgments in case of contests as to legal rights and duties.
III
Such is the doctrine, in essential terms. What, then, is the explana-
tion of its present disrepute?
I think that the chief source of opposition is the anti-metaphysical
character of modern thought. This anti-metaphysical bias takes various
forms, but generally speaking it amounts to a denial that there is any
valid form of knowledge other than the tentative findings of the experi-
mental sciences. Under this doctrine, nothing is absolute, and all is
relative. Things cannot be defined, but only described. All reference
to man's unique nature is spurious, because man differs from other
animals not specifically, essentially or qualitatively but only in degree.
The very concept of nature being rejected, anything purporting to be a
law rooted in such a nature is similarly inadmissible.
The attacks on metaphysics run all the way from saying that it is
harmless subjective day-dreaming to charging that it is the enemy of
freedom by its serving as the basis of an authoritarianism in the moral
and political spheres. The latter criticism accounts for the crusading
spirit which so often characterizes the anti-metaphysical partisans. From
their viewpoint, instead of vilifying man, they are leading a campaign
for his liberation from medieval bonds. The shift is from the barren
slavery of fixed ends to the rich liberty of uninhibited means. In law,
the point of reference is not the common good which is to be found in
the nature of man and human society, but human and social experiment
out of which the good is supposed to flow.
Against this anti-metaphysical background, natural law seeks in vain
to reestablish itself. Natural law doctrine involves two foundations, the
foundation of law in morals, and the foundation of morals in meta-
physics. The metaphysical foundation being removed, the whole struc-
ture collapses.
The situation was never described more graphically than by Mr.
Justice Holmes when he said that he saw "no reason for attributing to
man a significance different in kind from that which belongs to a baboon
or to a grain of sand",-from which he proceeded consistently to say,
"Our morality seems to me only a check on the ultimate domination of
force, just as our politeness is a check on the impulse of every pig to put
his feet in the trough".
The anti-metaphysical bias is so deeply rooted that it survives even
the observation that its consequences may be the amoral, totalitarian
state. Thus Max Lerner, in a book which is a tribute to Holmes, says of
Holmes' doctrine regarding the empty character of rights, "We have
here the behavioristic definition of law, squeezing it dry of all morality
and sentiment"; and Harold Laski, a similar devotee, says that Holmes
states law "in terms of an irresponsible and unlimited will such as
Hobbes himself would have strongly approved".
Allied to the anti-metaphysical position is the objection to anything
absolute in law. If there is no nature, there is nothing universal or im-
mutable. By asserting that there is anything absolute about law, natural
law doctrine has to go without recognition by modern thought.
The intellectual offense to the modern mind which is created by
the absolute has been aggravated by a gross abuse of natural law which
purported to deduce all positive laws from the first principle,--as if the
law of negotiable instruments were derived by way of conclusion from
the nature of man! Dean Pound once told the writer that in his early
years he had been so prejudiced by such nonsense that it took him a long
while to view the doctrine in its purer context.
A further impediment to general acceptance of natural law is the
setting with which it is popularly associated. That setting is scholastic,
Thomist, Catholic. There are, of course, adherents of natural law out-
side those circles, but the identification is conveniently made and, once
made, forthwith sets off the opposition. As a noted educator once said,
after Mr. Robert M. Hutchins had published one of his early books on
education, "Mr. Hutchins has gone metaphysical and will please no one
but the Catholics". (As if the Catholics had a monopoly of meta-
physics! )
The objection is really two-fold, that it is scholastic and that it is
Catholic. Scholasticism is in disfavor because it maintains that there
are some absolutes and that there is some certain knowledge and it lends
itself to the authority of the Church. The Church is in disfavor because
it speaks with authority in morals and in faith. Thus the doctrine comes
to be known as the "theological natural law", thereby exposing it to the
double prejudice of the anti-theological as well as the anti-Catholic mind.
Associated with these things is still another barrier, that of
terminology. To the thinker whose convictions place him generally in
the sphere called Thomist, a whole set of convenient terms is readily
available, but such a thinker deludes himself if he supposes that such
terminology is meaningful or welcome to the non-scholastic mind.
Imagine a discourse to a modern non-scholastic audience which proceeds
in terms like theoretic and practical reason; first, indemonstrable princi-
ple of the practical reason; first, intrinsic principle of operations that
are proper to a being; final, formal and efficient causality; conclusion and
determination; speculatively-practical and practically-practical. This
would be incommunicability at its worst; and incommunicability arouses
heat rather than light, hostility rather than understanding.
The terms natural law and positive law themselves create a flood of
misunderstanding, for if either is law, the other is law in such a different
sense that some explanation is obviously required as a condition of the
use of the term in the two phrases. The same may be said of the term
"absolute norms of conduct", for if the term norm there signifies the posi-
tive determination, the qualification "absolute" is gravely erroneous and
uselessly arouses opposition.
There are many other terminological difficulties. Without exploring
them further, it is sufficient to say that on this point alone-the mere
point of the verbal vehicles of communication-the fate of natural law
may hang in our time.
IV
It has not been difficult to portray, in broad outline, some of the chief
sources of present day opposition to natural law. To convert this opposi-
tion, however, is a matter of such difficulty that it is not at all surprising
that little or no progress has been made in that direction. For the task
is a huge one. Merely to state it reveals its all but overwhelming di-
mensions, because as indicated, one part of the task is nothing less than
converting the intellectual world from positivism to the philosophia
perennis.
Not being a philosopher, the author is not competent to discuss
such an undertaking. It is interesting, however, to observe the evolution
of a distinguished contemporary philosopher's thoughts on that subject.
In 1938 Mortimer J. Adler delivered the Aquinas Lecture at Marquette
University. The title of the lecture was Saint Thomas and the Gentiles.
In it Mr. Adler posed the problem and sketched a proposed plan for its
solution. In essence he suggested that in order to convert the philosophic
gentiles the Thomists must proceed inductively, by way of the order of
learning, with the positivists, not against them. The other way-pro-
ceeding from the principles-had failed, because the positivists do not ac-
cept the principles. Mr. Adler did not minimize the difficulties; in fact,
he said, it would probably require genius and certainly vast patience and
perseverance.
That was in 1938. Since then Mr. Adler has retreated even from
that position. Now, with a staff of assistants in San Francisco and with
the collaboration of some colleagues in other parts of the country in-
cluding Mr. Maritain, he is engaged in a long-term project called the
Summa Dialectica, the object of which is not to strive for doctrinal agree-
ment but to chart the areas of agreement and disagreement on the great
questions from ancient times to date. Mr. Adler and his colleagues are
convinced that the retreat is necessitated by the existing incommunicability
between philosophers and that the first step in putting philosophy back
on its perennial course must be the restoration of philosophic discourse,
and that the best means of doing that is through a dialectic which pro-
ceeds with strict neutrality to chart the various doctrines and the harmonies
and diversities between them.
Lawyers and students of jurisprudence may well leave such high
technical tasks to the philosophers, but unless we are to be completely
defeatist on the subject of natural law in our own time, we should mean-
while keep the cause alive wherever we can. In that respect, the doors
are not all closed against us. The modern philosopher may scoff and
rail against the natural law, but men of action like lawyers and judges
are generally more docile. Thus natural law survives in our legal
system in important respects such as in equity and in judicial interpre-
tation of the due process clauses of federal and state constitutions. Even
Holmes, when it came to deciding cases, spoke of "substantial justice"
and "fair play". In these fields-the fields of the judiciary, and of the
lawyer-there is an audience, and we should not neglect it just because
we cannot reach the philosophers themselves.
To do this a few things should be done, consisting chiefly of strip-
ping the doctrine of obscurities, abuses and distortions so that where
prejudices are not invincible it may find new adherents. I have space
but to illustrate with a few examples.
To propagate is to teach. And to teach natural law it should be
axiomatic that we begin with experience rather than with the natural law.
This is so because whereas the order of exposition begins with the princi-
ples the order of learning begins with experience. It goes from the
known to the unknown. Everybody knows laws. Therefore we should
start with laws and proceed through the precepts of which the laws are
determinations, to the principle of the common good which is the pur-
pose for which the laws are made.
Akin to this is the necessity of stressing the relativity of laws. This
is a scientific age. And the conclusions of science are relative because
they are descriptions rather than explanations of experience. In these
circumstances, any undue stressing of the absolute is not only a distortion
but also a tactical blunder. Rules of law are highly relative, because
they are man-made determinations of precepts derived from the natural
law. The only thing absolute about law is the principle. Even the pre-
cepts which are deduced from the principle, though they constitute neces-
sary means of the common good and hence are speculatively-practical in
character, are not strictly absolute, because they are intermediate between
the principle and rules of law and as such they partake of the nature of
each. They partake of the nature of positive rules in that they deal
with means, are dispensable in certain cases, and they are directed toward
the welfare of the political community. In these respects there is an
element of relativity in them. But when we come to the man-made
positive rule of law, the degree of relativity is very high, because what
man does in making a law is to determine what is left undetermined by
the principle and the intermediate precepts. Natural law is discovered;
positive law is made. The making is free, and therefore relative, insofar
as it is a determining of a particular just way of realizing the common
good prescribed by natural law where there are other just ways of doing
so. The reason for positive laws is that people must know what the
regulations are; they already know the natural law by the light of their
natural reason. It is true that there is an absolute element in laws, but
that is in the end which is served by laws, not in the particular means
by which the end is served.
This is linked with the point of terminology which I have mentioned,
namely the use of the word "law" in the two phrases "natural law" and
"positive law". Obviously the word law is used in different senses in
the two phrases, because of the radical difference between the first princi-
ple, seek the common good, and the man-made regulation, which may
be a traffic ordinance. The solution does not consist in saying that there
are two kinds of laws, natural laws and positive laws. If we define law
as a promulgated, authoritatively-made ordinance of reason for the com-
mon good, then we should say that law is partly natural and partly
positive. It is natural in its source or foundation and positive in its
conventional character as something made. On this account, both phrases
natural law and positive law are misnomers.
In the light of this distinction, there is an evident risk of mis-
understanding in the use of the expression "absolute standards of con-
duct". If "standard of conduct" is taken to mean the positive rule, the
word "absolute" is misused because positive rules are relative. If "standard
of conduct' is taken to mean the common good the phrase is correct
only in the sense that the common good, which is absolute, constitutes
the end which the rule must serve.
The importance of accuracy of expression on this point is that
natural law doctrine has gotten a false reputation of attributing absolute-
ness to laws. Common strategy dictates that anything which tends to
support that impression should be scrupulously avoided. There need be
no pious fear of betraying the moral law by stressing relativity in the
positive determinations. St. Thomas himself emphasized that laws were
imperfect, diverse and mutable and only generally speaking just. He
even compared the law-maker's striving for justice to the effort of the
physician to cure disease-eloquent evidence of relativity in view of
the state of medical science in the thirteenth century!
Similar need for clarification exists with respect to the so-called
"theological" aspect of natural law. The premises of theology are reve-
lation; those of the natural law are reason. The Church does not make
natural law; God makes it, and the Church is bound by it. True the
Church is an authoritative teacher of the natural moral law, but since
that law is a matter of reason rather than faith the Church declares
that though it belongs wholly to her it does not belong exclusively to
her. Moreover, as St. Thomas points out, while the obligation of the
natural law depends upon God, it does not depend upon a knowledge
of God for its efficacy. As far as knowledge goes, the proximate
sources of its obligation-conscience and experience--suffice to make it
binding.
Above and beyond all these things, we must remember that we
have in our legal system a natural law beachhead to protect. This con-
sists chiefly in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process
clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments as including substantive
rights and in its defining those rights as those which involve those "im-
mutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free gov-
ernment",1 those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions",2 and those im-
munities "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty".' This frank ac-
knowledgment of natural law is reflected in an opinion by Justice Harlan
wherein he said that "the courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so
restrained by technical rules that they could not find some remedy, con-
sistent with the law, for acts . . . that violated natural justice."4
This beachhead is not immune from attack. Two of the present
members of the Court are opposed to it. The concept needs continued
IHolden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898), 42 L. Ed. 780, 790.
2 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926), 71 L. Ed. 270, 273.
3 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 320 (1937), 82 L. Ed. 288, 292.
4Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 195 (1910), 54 L. Ed. 435,
443.
support in the literature of the law, in legal education, in briefs in the
cases where it is involved and in the various other channels of opinion.
V
These are but a few of the things to be done. There is more to be
done.
It is a worthy task, filled with both hope and fear.
It is hopeful, because although in the great tides of human thought
natural law rises and falls, it never disappears, since it partakes of the
persistence of nature. Thus philosophers deny it, but insofar as they are
virtuous they live by it. Jurists scoff at it and then read it into the con-
stitution and into their decisions. The curve of history and the rise
of democracy may be measured in its terms. As long as men reason,
it will inspire justice and promote the general welfare.
The task is fearful, because at times men cease to reason. Then
will alone governs, and in that case natural law and justice go into a
night. And when that darkness comes, the defection of the intellectuals
bears its heaviest responsibility, for behind the tyranny and the law-
lessness is an intellectual corruption.
Unwittingly, the prevailing philosophy of our day has opened the
road to tyranny. As A. Lawrence Lowell put it, having gained our
liberty with the natural law we Americans have discarded the doctrine
and adopted the opinions of the vanquished. It is always dangerous
to drop the natural law. It is especially dangerous to do so in the
twentieth century which has exhibited an exceptional tendency toward
those horrors which go with the denial of the nature of man.
Every age has its crisis. The crisis of our day is that of the natural
law. While our philosophers labor among their colleagues to revive
the perennial quest of wisdom on this subject, we of the law should take
our own part in that great enterprise. In doing so we may hope that if
among men of action we can preserve a basic adherence to this great
truth the day may be saved until the philosophers themselves resume
their rightful place at the head of the quest.
